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AMS Account Mapping Service - maps XtreemOS GUIDs to UIDs/GIDs
CDA Credential Distribution Authority
CA Certification Authority
GID Group Identifier (as used in Linux/UNIX)
GUID Global User Identifier - unique identifier for an XtreemOS user
GVID Global VO Identifier - unique identifier for an XtreemOS VO
RootCA Root Certification Authority
PKC Public Key Certificate
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RCA Resource Certification Authority
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Executive Summary
This deliverable aims at providing a complete description of the techniques for
trust management in XtreemOS. Our presentation of trust revolves around three
main elements: the model of trust adopted in XtreemOS, the mechanisms of ex-
changing such trust and finally, trust-enhancement services.
The XtreemOS trust model gives a high-level overview of how the different or-
ganisations, users, resources and services are divided and managed in XtreemOS.
The deliverable presents the main elements of the XtreemOS trust model: do-
mains, certification authorities, credentials and trust protocols. It is also discussed
possible alternative settings for the trust model, including the pros and cons of
each setting.
The main trust-establishment mechanism in XtreemOS is credentials. By us-
ing credentials, such as digital certificates, an entity can convey certain attributes
about itself to other entities for the purpose of enhancing the trustworthiness of
the former. The deliverable describes the type of information carried in XtreemOS
certificates and the main mechanisms for credential distribution.
Trust services permit the users of the XtreemOS operating system to have
better faith in its dependability when handling their job submissions. Our main
example of such services is the isolation mechanism, which allows users to run
their jobs in different degrees of isolation from other jobs.
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1 Introduction
This deliverable discusses the methodology and design alternatives for trust ser-
vices in XtreemOS. Our presentation of trust revolves around three main elements:
the model of trust adopted in XtreemOS, the mechanisms of exchanging such trust
and finally, trust-enhancement services.
The first element is the trust model itself, which gives a high-level overview of
how the different organisations, users, resources and core XtreemOS services are
divided and managed. The main element of trust is the domain, which specifies
the organisational boundaries of what can be trusted and where everything outside
is not to be trusted by default unless trust is enhanced using mechanisms and
services.
Credentials, such as digital certificates, are the main example of trust-establishment
mechanisms in XtreemOS through which an entity (user, resource, service) can
convey certain attributes about itself (such as its identity, features, context etc.) to
other entities for the purpose of enhancing the trustworthiness of the former.
Finally, trust services permit the users of the XtreemOS operating system to
have better faith in its dependability when handling their job submissions. Our
main example of such services is the isolation mechanism, which allows users to
run their jobs in different degrees of isolation from other jobs.
The rest of the deliverable is structured as follows: In Section 2, we introduce
the XtreemOS trust model and discuss possible alternative settings for this model
including the pros and cons of each setting. In Section 3, we discuss the format
of the digital certificates used in XtreemOS. In Section 4, we give the description
of the XtreemOS isolation service capabilities, its design and its application pro-
gramming interface. Finally, in Section 5, we conclude the deliverable and give
directions to future work.
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2 XtreemOS Trust Model
This section gives a general and brief overview of the XtreemOS trust model, first
discussed in [4], and used to integrate the different security and VO management
services by setting-up trust between them. It also concerns the setting-up of trust
between these services and users and resource providers.
2.1 Introduction
There have been many attempts in most fields of sciences and business domains
to define the notion of trust in order to explain certain behaviours or models. For
example, in the domain of social sciences, Gambetta [9] defines trust as the sub-
jective probability by which an individual expects that some other individual will
perform a given action or set of actions on which the former individual’s over-
all welfare depends. On the other hand, in the economic domain, the European
Commission Joint Research Centre defines trust as that property of business re-
lationships, which allows reliance to be placed on the business partners and the
business transactions developed among them [13].
One of the earliest attempts to give a computational definition of trust came
from Marsh [15], based on Deutch’s notes on trust [7], which state that trusting
behaviour occurs when individuals perceive ambiguous (good or bad) paths whose
end result is dependent on the actions of other persons, where bad results are
more harming than good results are beneficial. If individuals choose to go down
a path, they can be said to have made a trustful choice. This definition of paths
resembles the notion of execution traces in language semantics and suggests that
some degree of trust is needed in making trace choices.
Grandison and Sloman [11] provide a more recent definition of trust in the con-
text of computer security. They regard trust as the firm belief in the competence
of an entity to act dependably, securely and reliably within a specified context.
Trust is classified into several calsses among which are service provision trust and
certification trust. Service provision trust denotes the reliance of a user on the
functionality of a service, which is an essential aspect of Grid-based applications,
whereas certification trust refers to trust built on a set certified attributes.
Josang et al. [14] make a difference between reliability trust as a subjective
probability, perceived according to Gambetta’s definition above, and decision trust
as being the extent to which an entity is willing to depend on some other entity in a
given situation or context with a feeling of relative security, even though negative
consequences are possible.
Falcone and Castelfranchi [8] present a cognitive view of trust applied to the
context of task delegation. When delegating a task, an entity might evaluate the
trust it places on another entity considering the different beliefs it has about the
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latter. These include: 1) competence beliefs, i.e. the delegatee is competent to
do the task, 2) disposition beliefs, i.e. the delegatee actually will do the task, 3)
dependence beliefs, i.e. the delegator entity believes that at least it is better to rely
on the delegatee for the task than not to rely on it, 4) fulfillment beliefs, i.e. the
delegator believing that the task can be done, 5) willingness beliefs: the delegatee
intends to carry out the task, 6) persistence beliefs, i.e. the delegatee is stable
enough with regards to its intentions, 7) self-confidence beliefs, i.e. the delegator
should believe that the delegatee knows it can do the task and finally, 8) motivation
beliefs, i.e. the delegatee has some motive to run or execute the task.
2.1.1 Trust in XtreemOS
In XtreemOS, the notion of trust that we adopt is based on three main aspects.
First, trust is perceived as an administrative separation of resource and service
ownership and management. Different organisations, resource owners, users and
core XtreemOS service managers are allocated their own domains, which define
their own boundaries of trust. This notion is based on the notion of service pro-
vision trust defined by Grandison and Sloman [11]. Second, trust is asserted in
special tokens created based on cryptographic mechanisms such as digital certifi-
cates and other credentials, which are then verified by their consumers. These
tokens convey verifiable attributes of entities that allow them to establish trust
with other entities existent in other domains. This aspect is similar to certifica-
tion trust as defined by Grandison and Sloman [11]. Finally, the transmission of
trust tokens is achieved via trustworthy communication channels and protocols,
which could be either offline possibly involving humans or cryptographic such as
authentication protocols based on the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol [12].
In the following sections, we shall discuss trust domains and the different ele-
ments of the XtreemOS trust model.
2.2 Trust Domains
Trust domains refer to the separations in the ownership and management of soft-
ware and hardware resources as well as human membership. Administrative do-
mains are a type of trust domains. We use the term trust domain to indicate the
level of assurance that each domain provides the designers, administrators and
users of the XtreemOS operating system with.
Assuming that S → S ′ is an assurance ordering relation taken from some
lattice of assurance levels (e.g. [6]) to indicate that S has a higher assurance level,
and thereby is more trustworthy, than S ′, then Figure 1 illustrates this relation
among the three main trust domains in XtreemOS, Core Sites, Resource Sites and
User Sites.
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Resource Site User Site
Core Site
Figure 1: Ordering among the XtreemOS Trust Domains.
A VO is regarded as a logical domain, which comprises a single Core site and
any number of Resource and User sites. In the following sections, we discuss each
of these domains.
2.2.1 Core Site Domain
The Core Site domain is the domain in which all the core security and VO man-
agement services, as described in [3], are running. This implies that the site must
be the most trusted site, and therefore, must have a high level of assurance. This
domain may be split into two domains, as shown in Figure 2.
Core Site (Offline)
Core Site (Online)
Figure 2: Online and Offline Core Site Domains.
• Online Core Site Domain: This domain represents the site in which any
security and VO management service running in the online mode is hosted.
This means that the domain is networked to other domains, however, it still
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maintains high levels of assurance by adopting strong security protection
measures.
• Offline Core Site Domain: This domain is an offline site in which the most
sensitive element in the trust chain is running, i.e. the Root Certification
Authority as will be explained later on in the section on trust model ele-
ments. This site has no network connections to any other sites, it utilised
strict security measures and its services are only accessible via authorised
administrators interactions. Therefore, the site is considered to have the
highest assurance level among all other sites.
2.2.2 Resource Site Domain
The Resource Site domain represent any domain in which resources (machines,
services, software) are hosted and are connected to the Grid, therefore making
them available to any VOs formed out of the Grid. The level of assurance of a
resource site cannot be guaranteed and hence they represent a lower trust level
than the core site.
2.2.3 User Site Domain
The User Site domain is any domain hosting users of the Grid, which may apply to
join VOs and avail of the VO resources. User sites have no guarantees regarding
their assurance levels, therefore, the user site domain is considered to be lower in
trust than the core site. Note that user and resource sites cannot be compared in
their levels of assurance.
2.3 Elements of the Trust Model
We now turn our attention to the main elements constituting the XtreemOS trust
model. These are shown in Figure 3. These elements can be classified into five
categories: Certification Authorities, Users, Resources, Credentials and Proto-
cols. We discuss these categories in the next sections.
2.3.1 Certification Authorities
Certification authorities represent points of trust from which users and resources
can obtain credentials to certify their identities and/or their attributes. These con-
stitute our definition of a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). We define three such au-
thorities: the Root Certification Authority (Root CA), the Credential Distribution
Authority (CDA) and Resource Certification Authority (RCA). These authorities
are organised in a hierarchy as shown in Figure 3, where trust is delegated from
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Figure 3: The XtreemOS Trust Model.
the Root CA to the CDA and then to the RCA. This trust delegation implies that
the CDA has its public key signed by the Root CA and that the RCA has its public
key signed by the CDA. The Root CA itself is a self-signing authority meaning
that it will sign its own public key.
An important advantage of adopting separate authorities for users (CDAs) and
resources (RCAs) is that one can achieve cleanly a separation of concerns between
user credential management and resource credential management through the use
of the CDA and RCA services. This design strategy ensures modularity and better
representation of trust in the real world.
The Root Certification Authority. The Root CA is the trust anchor for any
XtreemOS-based Grid system. The Root CA can be configured to issue identity
certificates to the core services, or it may delegate this task to the CDA. The Root
CA always delegates trust to the CDA for the purpose of certifying users and
resource sites. This means that the Root CA does not itself certify any large-scale
Grid system but rather provides atrust anchor for that system. Such an anchor of
trust is necessary to bootstrap trust, either initially in the Grid or whenever any
of the other services are compromised and their certificates need to be reissued.
Without an anchor, it is not possible to (re)bootstrap trust in a distributed system
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such as a Grid. Therefore, it is important to ensure that the Root CA is highly
protected from unauthorised accesses and is running on a highly secured machine.
The Root CA operates in an offline mode. This means that any trust delegation
(to the CDA) is carried out via offline means (e.g. emails, telephones, adminis-
trators direct access using command line programs). No network connection is
provided to any services or programs running on different machines. This is con-
sidered to provide a higher assurance level than if the Root CA provided online
access, which would increase the risk of the Root CA being compromised (e.g.
by the theft of the Root CA private key).
The Certificate Distribution Authority. The CDA acts as a subordinate of the
Root CA to which trust is delegated by the Root CA. This delegation of trust
means that the CDA can certify the public keys of users and RCAs such that any
entity consuming those certificates will be able to trace the chain of trust up to
the Root CA. The CDA also can issue any attribute certificates to users to indicate
their VO attributes such as their membership of particular VOs. The CDA serves
several main purposes:
• It acts as the online frontend to the Root CA, if the Root CA is running in the
offline mode. Therefore, one can achieve a separation of concerns between
the management of the Root CA’s security and its online functionality.
• The CDA permits the separation between user certification and resource
site certification as represented by the RCA. It functions as a distribution
authority separating between users and RCAs.
• The CDA acts as a trust domain within which VOs can be formed out of any
users and RCAs that have been certified by a common CDA.
The Resource Certification Authority. The RCA is a subordinate of the CDA
to which trust is delegated by the CDA for purpose of managing resource certifi-
cation within the RCA’s site. The RCA facilitates the following:
• The management of the resource certification within each site belonging to
the Grid.
• The separation of concerns from the CDA, as the CDA does not have to
manage the certification of each and every resource in the Grid.
In its own site, the RCA will certify the public keys of resources belong to that
site. Additionally, it can also issue any attribute certificates required for those
resources, such as certificates stating the storage capacity, speed of processor and
assurance and QoS levels.
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2.3.2 Credentials
Credentials are pieces of data held by the different actors that provide some form
of information required by the capability that the actor requires to perform. Cre-
dentials have the general format <Assertion, Proof, Validity>, where the Assertion
represents some attributes of the subject of the credential, Proof is verifiable in-
formation that the assertion is true and Vailidity are some conditions that render
the credential itself valid.
Credentials may or may not have been created using cryptographic means.
Passwords are examples of non-cryptographic credentials whereas digital certifi-
cates based on the X-509 standard [17] represent cryptographic credentials. In the
following sections, we discuss three types of credentials used in XtreemOS.
Passwords. Passwords are the simplest form of credentials created by users and
resource site administrators, e.g. during the initial request for registration phase
(part of the Grid Management Capabilities) in a Grid from the Grid administrator.
These passwords will be used in a password-based authentication protocol, such
as the Secure Remote Password (SRP) [19], to establish secure (i.e. secretive and
authenticated) communication channels.
A password has the format <Assertion=username+password, Proof=(asserted
password==stored password), Validity=password renewal>. The proof is that the
asserted password supplied by the entity being authenticated must be the same as
the password stored by the system. The validty of this password is then deter-
mined by whether it has passed its renewal date/time or not.
Identity Certificates. These are digital certificates that enable their consumer
to validate cryptographically the binding between the identity of the certificate’s
holder and its public key. This binding is important as it allows the consumer in
the future to validate the authenticity of any information signed by the certificate
holder. In XtreemOS, identity certificates are issued to any entity in the trust
model - in fact, these are the most essential trust mechanism without which entities
cannot participate in any VOs.
Identity certificates have the format <Assertion=subject-has-identity, Proof=pubKey-
of-issuer validates certificate signature, Validity=expiration-of-certificate>. This
format states that the assertion is that the subject has the identity in the certifi-
cates. The proof is that the public key of the issuer validates the signature on the
certificate, and finally, the validity is the date/time expiration of the certificate.
Attribute Certificates. Technically, these are similar to the identity certificates
except their purpose is different. Instead of binding the entity to its public key, the
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attribute certificate has a field enumerating all the attributes of the entity. Attribute
certificates are necessary in order to prove that entities has certain attributes. For
example, users could be issued attribute certificates by the CDA to certify that they
are members of certain VOs. RCAs also issue attribute certificates to resources to
bind them to their functional and qualitative attributes.
Attribute certificates have the format, <Assertion=subject-has-attribute, Proof=pubKey-
of-issuer validates certificate signature, Validity=expiration-of-certificate>. This
is similar to the format of the identity certificates except that the assertion is re-
lated to some attribute(s) of the subject.
2.3.3 Users
Users are either humans or software that interact with the XtreemOS system and
utilise the Grid resources within well-defined VOs.
2.3.4 Resources
These are the individual machines that offer computational and storage power to
the Grid.
2.3.5 Protocols
Protocols refer to the sets of well-defined message-passing interactions used to
carry certificates and other data messages among the certification authorities, users
and resources in the model. In the context of the XtreemOS trust model, the main
purpose of protocols, in addition to exchanging information, is to have a procedure
for the establishment of trust among the different elements of the trust model. In
the following paragraphs, we discuss a number of such protocols.
The XtreemOS User Registration Protocol. This protocol represents the entry
point for users who wish to use the resources offered by a XtreemOS-enabled
Grid. It is, in some sense, a pre-authentication step to what will follow. XtreemOS
users will normally apply for an account in an XtreemOS Grid through a web
interface called VOWeb. This allows the applicant to enter their account details
(such as username and password), and contact details (such as organisation and
e-mail address). The steps involved are:
• The user accesses the VOWeb registration page through their Web browser.
To protect the confidentiality of user account details, this should only be
accessed over an HTTPS connection secured with SSL. The user submits
an application to join the Grid.
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• The Grid administrator views the application and may wish to obtain more
details about the user in order to verify the authenticity of their request.
This communication between Grid administrator and the applicant may be
offline in the form of email exchanges, phone calls, or even face-to-face
meetings between the two parties.
• If the Grid administrator approves the request, the user is informed via email
and can then start using their account in the Grid. Otherwise, the request is
rejected and the user is notified.
The process above is similar to signing-up to conventional online services. The
Grid administrator has the option, when considering a registration request, of ap-
plying a level of scrutiny to the registration applications appropriate to the level
of security and assurance required in their Grid. Once the user has had their ap-
plication approved, they can use the VOWeb application to join existing VOs or
to create their own VOs. The user can then request an XOS-Certificate containing
their VO attributes.
Obtaining a user XOS-Certificate. The main aim behind this process is to al-
low the users to be certified by the CDA, which will allow them to start creating
VOs and to use VO resources. More concisely, it allows the users to enter the
operational mode of the VO.
In this process, the user can obtain their XOS-Certificate from either the VOWeb
application or from the command-line CDA client program. In both cases, the
underlying protocol used is the same and takes place over an encrypted, authenti-
cated channel obtained using SSL, where we denote by [A −→ B] SSL-secured
communications from A to B:
1. [U −→ C]: username, password
2. [C −→ U ]: status
3. [U −→ C]: CSRU
4. [C −→ U ]: (< certU >SKC , < certC >SKR)
In step 1, the user, U , sends their username and password to the CDA server,
C. The CDA server then returns in step 2 the status corresponding to the authen-
tication of the user. If this authentication status indicates that the user has been
authenticated (step 2), then the protocol proceeds by sending a Certificate Signing
Request (CSRU ) to the CDA server in step 3. This CSR contains the user’s public
key and request attributes, all signed with the user’s private key. The CDA server
authenticates the CSR by checking the signature, then creates an XOS certificate,
which is essentially a X.509v3 certificate containing the user’s public key and
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their VO attributes in extension fields. In step 4, the CDA server sends back to
the user a certificate chain (< certU >SKC , < certC >SKR) consisting of the XOS
certificate of the user certU >SKC signed by the CDA’s private key SKC and the
CDA’s own certificate < certC >SKR , signed by the Root CA’s private key SKR.
At the end of this protocol, the user can demonstrate in a verifiable manner its
own identity, which will be trusted by any VOs that trust the Root CA.
The Resource Certificate Distribution Protocol. In the second protocol, the
RCA, R, aims at obtaining a root certificate and identity certificate from CDA, C:
1. [R −→ C]: CSRR
2. [C −→ R]: (< certR >SKC , < certC >SKC )
where CSRR is a request from the RCA for the certificate signing by the CDA,
< certR >SKC is the RCA’s identity certificate signed by the private key of C, and
< certC >SKC is a self-signed root certificate issued and signed by C.
The Protocol between Machines and RCAs. In general, machines need to reg-
ister with at least one local RCA securely. Because machines are operated within
the same administrative (trust) domain as their RCA, the problem of establishing
a secure channel between a machine and its RCA is resolved locally within the
domain. This will depend on the level of security and assurance adopted in the
domain. Therefore, we do not describe here how a secure channel (if needed) is
obtained between a machine and its RCA, since this is a local issue.
An Alternative Online Registration Protocol using password-based authenti-
cation via SRP. In many online registration systems, users access a web form to
enter their account details (username/password) and contact details. To guarantee
the confidentiality of their account details, the web form will use HTTPS. This en-
tails the applicant having to trust and accept the SSL certificate presented by their
web browser upon initiating the connection, unless the server certificate has been
signed by one of the root certificates installed in their browser. The web browser
can verify the certificate chain from the server SSL certificate to the trusted root
certificate.
The options the user is faced with are summed-up as follows:
• They trust, without question, the validity and authenticity of the SSL server
certificate. This is not an uncommon occurrence, but may make the user
less confident in the overall registration process;
17
• They can import the SSL server certificate (or the certificate used to sign the
SSL server certificate) into their browser. This raises the issue of how the
user can obtain the certificates in the first place.
We can achieve the aim of reducing the certificate set-up overhead needed with
conventional PKI-based approaches by giving the user a certificate-less method of
securely registering their details. The alternative method relies on the user or the
RCA administrator (i.e. the ‘requester’) accessing the registration manager over
a confidential channel, which is based on an instance of the Secure Remote Pass-
word (SRP) protocol [19]. At this stage, the authenticity of the entities involved
does not need to be guaranteed, as there is a conventional approval step following
the registration whereby the identity of the requester and its attributes can be es-
tablished. The registration client and manager can share the username/password
for a pre-defined registration account to establish an SRP-based channel. The reg-
istration client can hide the channel username/password from the requester by au-
tomatically establishing a SRP connection when it is invoked, rather than the user
needing to provide the username and password for the channel account. Once
the SRP channel has been established, the requester can provide their account de-
tails (username and password), and their contact details. The registration manager
stores this information in the registration database for approval by conventional
(manual) means, which we do not describe here.
2.4 Design Alternatives for the Trust Model
In addition to the model presented in the previous section, we introduce in this
subsection a set of alternative designs for the trust model.
2.4.1 Single Root CA with Multiple CDAs
A first alternative model is based on having multiple CDAs all running under the
same Root CA as shown in Figure 4.
The main advantage of this model is that it permits the division of the Grid
into trust domains each with its own CDA. Each domain will also be responsible
for the certification of its own users, RCAs and resources, which facilitates fur-
ther the scalability of trust. The failure of one CDA, for example as a result of
compromising its private key, will not result in the failure of the certification of
RCAs and users belonging to the other CDAs. Moreover, the model allows users
belonging to one CDA domain to utilise resources certified by another domain,
hence, catering for resource expansion.
Nonetheless, as shown in Figure 5, as a result of the presence of multiple
CDAs, a man-in-the-middle attack can be mounted by a malicious user who’s
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Figure 4: An Alternative XtreemOS Trust Model with multiple CDAs.
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Figure 5: A Man-in-the-Middle Scenario on the multiple CDAs Model.
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already compromised a CDA. In this attack, the malicious user will simply set-up
and run a fake CDA using the stolen private key, which can then start certifying
his own group of users and possibly other fake RCAs. This attack would not
have been possible in the single CDA scenario since a second CDA would be
disallowed to run.
2.4.2 Multiple Root CAs with Multiple Trust Delegations
The second alternative to the XtreemOS trust model is the one shown in Figure 6.
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Figure 6: Another Alternative XtreemOS Trust Model with multiple Root CAs
and Multiple Trust Delegations.
In this alternative model, the Grid itself is divided into multiple trust domains
by running multiple Root CAs. Hence, there can be several roots of trust. This
multiplicity at the root requires the definition of the relationship among the differ-
ent trust domains. In this case, the model provides the possibility of one domain
to trust the Root CA of another domain by simply obtaining a certificate for the
CDA of one domain signed by the Root CA of the other domain.
This model has the advantage of providing more granularity at the Grid level
regarding the management of trust, and at the same time, it is possible to allow
users from one Grid domain to utilise resources from another domain. Another
advantage also is that failure of one Root CA will not impact trust in the domain
of other Root CAs.
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Similar to the man-in-the-middle attack in the previous model, in this model,
a malicious user who’s able to compromise the Root CA of some Grid domain
will be able to set-up a fake Root CA and hence, run masquerade the Grid domain
belonging to that Root CA, as is shown in Figure 7.
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Figure 7: The Man-in-the-Middle Scenario in the Second Alternative XtreemOS
Trust Model.
2.4.3 Multiple Root CAs with Cross Certifications
The last alternative model we discuss here is one in which there are multiple Root
CAs, which are cross-certified as shown in Figure 8.
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Figure 8: Another Alternative to the XtreemOS Trust Model with Multiple Root
CAs with Cross Certification.
Cross-certification here means that each Root CA will certify (by signing the
public key of) any other Root CAs it trusts. Therefore, users (resources) from
the trust domain of the latter Root CA will be trusted by resources (users) from
the domain of the former, simply because it will be possible to create a chain
of certificates leading to the latter Root CA from entities of the domain of the
former. This has the advantage in that one domain can be expanded to include
other domains thus for example, achieving resource scalability.
Similar to the model of the previous section, this model two has the same man-
in-the-middle vulnerability. Additionally, as noted in [1], cross-certification can
have negative implications in the compatibility of levels of assurance in the cross-
certified domains. For example, a “high level of assurance" classification may
have different meanings in each domain thus leading to the possibility of reducing
the assurance levels of some domains.
2.5 Comparison of Different Trust Models
The above mentioned alternatives for the XtreemOS trust model present varying
degrees of complexity, flexibility and decentralisation of trust bootstrapping, es-
tablishment and management. In this section, we define a number of common
criteria to compare these alternatives:
• Degree of Administration: This factor denotes the number of administrators
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requried to bootstrap the trust model to a working Grid. The more the num-
ber of administrators required, the more expensive the model is regarding
time and resources.
• Domain Multiplicity: This factor refers to the multiplicity of the trust do-
mains established in each model within a single Grid. These include the
numbers of user, ressource and core sites as well as VO domains and ulti-
mately, the number of Grids that can be set-up.
• Maintenance Complexity: This factor denotes the maintenance complexity
of each model. This includes the complexity of setting-up trust
• Decentralisation of Attack Points: This factor refers to the decentralisation
degree of attacks on each model.
According to these criteria, Table 1 shows how each model behaves.
Model Administration Domain Multiplicity Maintenance Complexity Attack Decentralisation
Single Root CA/
Single CDA Low Low High Low
Single Root CA/
Multiple CDAs Medium Medium Medium Medium
Multiple Root CAs with
Multiple Delegations High High Low High
Multiple Root CAs with
Cross Certitification High High Low High
Table 1: Comparison of XtreemOS Trust Models.
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3 Certificate Management in XtreemOS
In this section, we describe the types of certificates used in XtreemOS, their pur-
pose, and which components and services create and consume them.
3.1 Introduction
XtreemOS uses the well-established X.509 certificate format, part of the standard
for Public Key Infrastructure. The Public Key Certificate (PKC) for an entity car-
ries the public key for that entity and can be used at various points in an XtreemOS
system. The private key corresponding to the entity’s public key must be kept se-
cured and not disclosed to other entities.
3.2 Compliance with Standards and Recommendations
To enable interoperability between XtreemOS components using different im-
plementations of the TLS/SSL protocol, and to assist interoperability between
XtreemOS and Grid middleware systems such as gLite[10], the transport mech-
anisms and format of security credentials use well-established Internet standards
and the most relevant sections of the OGF Grid Certificate Profile[5]. Communi-
cations interfaces to the most critical security services use a text-based protocol
which is published to allow alternative implementations.
3.3 Certificate Lifecycle
Certificates are issued by a central entity, the Root CDA1. Certificates have a va-
lidity period set by the interval between the values set in the certificate fields
“notBefore” and “notAfter”. By contrast, the corresponding private key does not
expire. This allows the user to use an existing private key when requesting a new
public key certificate (avoiding the needed to generate a new keypair and set a new
passphrase).
User certificates are consumed by XOS-SSHD, where the XOS-Certificate is
used in mapping the user’s GUID to a local Unix UID/GID on the remote host.
User certificates are also consumed by the AEM Job Manager. A certificate may
be revoked at any point during its validity period, which means that its status is set
to not valid. This may be necessary. The change in the certificate’s status can be
made available to XtreemOS nodes that wish to check the validity of certificates.
1We use the term root CDA whenever the CDA is running an online root CA functionality.
3.4 Types of information carried in certificates
All certificates in XtreemOS carry at least some form of identity information, in
addition, some other XtreemOS certificates carry additional attributes about the
entity concerned. Identity information is used, along with a signature verification
on the certificate, to check the authenticity of an entity. Attribute information is
used to check that the entity is authorised to carry out a certain operation.
XtreemOS services use the certificate header field “Subject” to carry infor-
mation about the identity of the entity. Additional information may be carried
in standard certificate extension fields, such as “KeyUsage” and “subjectAlterna-
tiveName” fields. Attributes are carried in XtreemOS-specific extension fields (for
example, the user’s VO attributes). The XtreemOS-specific certificate extensions
are readable by common tools such as OpenSSL.
Identity Identity certificates for services carry details such as the address of
the node running the server, and the service type (e.g. CDA, VOPS, RCA). The
identity certificate for the user (the XOS-Certificate) carries the user’s identity
in both the standard “Subject” certificate header field, and in the Global User
Identifier (GUID) certificate extension field.
Attributes The user’s VO attributes (such as GUID and VO membership) are
carried in certificate extension fields as simple, comma-separated string values.
Attribute certificates are used by the Resource Certification Authority (RCA) to
describe the resources available on a particular resource node.
Certificate Types and Usage XtreemOS uses the X.509 v3 format. The table
below lists, for each type of certificate, the issuer of the certificate and its purpose.
The XtreemOS components which inspect the certificate, and the key usage as-
sociated with the certificate, are also described. The following abbreviations are
used:
AuthC Authenticate an entity (prove their identity)
AuthZ Authorise an entity (used to determine which actions the entity can per-
form)
CDA The Credential Distribution Authority - distributes user certificates and ser-
vice identity certificates
CRL Certificate Revocation List - a static list of certificates which have been
revoked
25
Cert Sign Use the corresponding private key to sign a certificate (used by a CA
entity)
CRL Sign Use the corresponding private key to sign a CRL (used by a CA entity)
Dig Sig Use the corresponding private key to provide a digital signature on data
RCA The Resource Certification Authority - distributes certificates for resource
nodes
Root CDA The Root CA if this is enabled to operate offline, or the CDA if this
is enabled to handle all certificate requests in online mode
SSL Client Use the certificate to authenticate the client side of a TLS/SSL con-
nection
SSL Server Use the certificate to authenticate the server side of a TLS/SSL con-
nection
VOPS VO Policy Service
vNode set The nodes constituting the Virtual Node replica set
The different certificates used in XtreemOS are shown in Table 2.
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3.5 Credential Distribution
Credential distribution consists of the following steps:
• A public/private keypair is generated on the local node;
• The public key is sent in a Certificate Signing Request to an XtreemOS
Certificate Authority (either the RootCA, the CDA, or the RCA);
• The XtreemOS CA signs the CSR, producing a public key certificate which
is returned to the local node.
These steps occur at various stages during the creation and operation of an
XtreemOS Grid.
For setting up core services, XtreemOS offers the Grid Administrator the
choice of using an offline Root Certificate Authority (Root CA), which can be
on a machine physically isolated from the network (hence not open to compro-
mise); this offers the highest level of trust in the Root CA credentials, but requires
out-of-band communication (e.g. email transfer of Certificate Signing Requests
to the operator of the Root CA). Alternatively, the Root CA function can be deliv-
ered by the CDA server, thus providing an online Root CA. All other certificate
requests, apart from those relating to resources, are handled automatically by the
CDA server without the need for human intervention.
3.5.1 Credential Distribution for the Grid-wide Core Services
The XtreemOS core services, such as RCA, VOPS, XtreemFS, will need to be
set up (at least minimally) before the Grid can start operation. (Additional core
services such as extra RCA servers can also be set up during the operation of a
Grid). This setup is accomplished by Grid Administrator role. The pre-cursor to
setting up core services is to set up the Root CDA, which is then used to distribute
credentials for the other core services.
3.5.2 Credential Distribution for the VO-specific Resource Selection Service
(RSS)
An instance of the RSS is needed for each VO. This setup is accomplished by an
Administrator who is either an Owner or Administrator for the specific VO. This
Administrator uses the machine VO attribute certificate, issued by the RCA for
this specific VO, to set up this instance of the RSS.
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3.5.3 Credential Distribution for the Virtual Node replica set
In a similar fashion, the Administrator configuring up a set of modes to act as
Virtual Nodes obtains a Virtual Node certificate, containing the DNS or IP address
for each node, along with a Universally Unique Identifier (UUID). This is then
supplied to the AEM Job Manager along with a JSDL file specifying the creation
of a Virtual Node replica set. The Administrator uses the command “get-vnode-
cert” to obtain a vNode certificate from the CDA.
3.5.4 Obtaining User Credentials
The user can obtain an XOS-Certificate after they have registered with the XtreemOS
Grid (normally via the VOLife web interface).
The method of obtaining the user XOS-Certificate is to run a command-line
tool, the CDA client program “get-xos-cert”. This communicates with the CDA
server to request a certificate containing the user’s public key, their identity (GUID),
and their other VO attributes. The user needs to authenticate themselves by pro-
viding a valid username/password pair for a valid account in the Grid registra-
tion database. By default, the “get-xos-cert’ command places the credentials in
system-defined default location in the user’s filestore where other XtreemOS com-
mands expect to find them.
This creates a private key for the user (or re-uses an existing private key for
efficiency), and requests the CDA to sign a certificate request containing the user’s
public key.
3.5.5 Obtaining Service Credentials
Obtaining service credentials can be accomplished in one of two ways. If the Root
CDA is configured to generate service identity certificates, the “get-service-cert”
command can be used by a user with Administrator privileges (having the “Ad-
min” role) to obtain a certificate directly from the CDA server, with the user being
able to specify the output locations on the command line.
If the Root CDA is configured to operate in the manual, offline mode, the
“get-service-cert” command creates a Certificate Signing Request which needs to
be sent by e-mail to the operator of the Root CDA, In this case, the operator of
the Root CDA will need to authenticate the request by means such as contacting
the sender of the request by out-of-band means, such as e-mail or telephone. The
operator of the Root CDA will send the signed certificate back to the requestor
by email, who will have to manually install the certificate and private key. Loca-
tions of the credentials, and the private key pass-phrase, need to be specified in
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the properties file for the service concerned.
RSS Certificates contain a field “RSS-VO:” specifying the GVID of the VO
for which the RSS is being set up. An RSS certificate can be requested by the
owner or administrator of this VO.
Virtual Node certificates contain a list of node addresses where members of
the Virtual Node replica set will run.
Resource certificates are obtained by a series of interactions between the re-
source administrator operating on a resource node, and the RCA administrator
operating the RCA server. The steps involved in getting a resource certificate for
a resource node, then adding the resource node to a VO and obtaining a VO at-
tribute certificate, are described in [3], pp84.
3.6 Example Certificates
In this section, we show the typical contents of a service identity certificate, a user
XOS-Certificate, a RCA VO Attribute certificate, and the fields specific to an RSS
certificate and a vNode certificate. The fields used in these certificates are shown
in Table 3.
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Service Identity Certificate Contents. In the certificate shown below, the ad-
dress of the node runnning the service is encoded into the Subject field, and the
subjectAlternativName DNSname field.
Issuer: CN=XtreemOS Testbed CA, O=XtreemOS Project,
OU=Permananent Testbed Root CA
Validity
Not Before: Jul 1 08:22:05 2009 GMT
Not After : Jul 1 08:22:05 2010 GMT
Subject: O=Permanent Testbed CDA, OU=cda,
CN=xtreemos-a.esc.rl.ac.uk/cda
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
RSA Public Key: (1024 bit)
Modulus (1024 bit):
...
Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
X509v3 extensions:
Netscape Comment:
XtreemOS Certificate
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
E5:DE:70:FA:59:56:B6:A7:64:7A:61:FA:
B4:BE:D9:F9:B4:51:D1:3D
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
DirName:/CN=XtreemOS Testbed CA/
O=XtreemOS Project/OU=Permananent Testbed Root CA
serial:E4:12:B5:BC:33:29:6B:3B
X509v3 Basic Constraints:
CA:TRUE
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
DNS:xtreemos-a.esc.rl.ac.uk
X509v3 Key Usage:
Digital Signature, Key Encipherment,
Certificate Sign
Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
...
Figure 9: Service Identity Certificate
XOS-Certificate contents. The most important elements of a user XOS-Certificate
can be displayed with the “view-xos-cert” command. The example below is for
a user who owns the VO with Global VO Identifier “2c0e8cb2-4453-46fe-85b7-
74874e76e7c2”. The user is an Administrator for the VOs “4c0e8cb2-4453-46fe-
32
85b7-74874e76e7d0” and
“5c0e8cb2-4453-46fe-85b7-74874e76e709”.
Issuer: O=Permanent Testbed CDA,
OU=cda, CN=xtreemos-a.esc.rl.ac.uk/cda
Validity
Not Before: Feb 1 20:53:26 2010 GMT
Not After : Feb 1 21:03:26 2011 GMT
Subject: CN=ea9a7366-e34f-4a99-9e31-277430366475
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
CA:FALSE
X509v3 Key Usage: critical
Digital Signature, Key Encipherment
X509v3 Extended Key Usage: critical
TLS Web Client Authentication
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
2C:07:20:F1:FD:7F:FB:DA:61:F6:B2:46:
1B:13:F9:12:FA:45:59:A4
XtreemOS VO Attributes:
GlobalPrimaryVOName:
2c0e8cb2-4453-46fe-85b7-74874e76e7c2
GlobalSecondaryVONames:
2c0e8cb2-4453-46fe-85b7-74874e76e7c2
GlobalUserID:
ea9a7366-e34f-4a99-9e31-277430366475
GlobalPrimaryGroupName:
ae88816f-9f5c-48f9-ad7d-f71a64977904
GlobalSecondaryGroupNames:
null
Role:
null
Group:
group1
Subgroup:
null
Owner-Of:
2c0e8cb2-4453-46fe-85b7-74874e76e7c2
Admin-Of:
4c0e8cb2-4453-46fe-85b7-74874e76e7d0,
5c0e8cb2-4453-46fe-85b7-74874e76e709
Figure 10: User XOS-Certificate
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RCA VO Attribute Certificate Contents. The VO Attribute Certificate shown
below is for a resource added to the VO with GVID “2c0e8cb2-4453-46fe-85b7-
74874e76e7c2”.
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
Issuer: O=XLAB, OU=rca, CN=core.xlab.si/rca
Validity
Not Before: Jan 29 15:05:49 2010 GMT
Not After : Feb 28 15:15:49 2010 GMT
Subject: C=SL, L=Ljubljana, OU=Research, O=XLAB,
CN=Address = [://172.16.117.14:60000(172.16.117.14)]
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
RSA Public Key: (1024 bit)
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
CA:FALSE
X509v3 Key Usage: critical
Digital Signature, Key Encipherment,
Data Encipherment
X509v3 Extended Key Usage: critical
2.5.29.37.0
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
keyid:E8:2D:8A:5E:73:1F:94:ED:1
8:E3:F8:68:47:8E:A3:05:80:97:41:9F
DirName:/CN=xtreemos-a.esc.rl.ac.uk/cda,
O=Permanent Testbed CDA, OU=cda,
CPUSpeed:
3.605004288E9
CPUCount:
1
MemorySize:
3.06184192E8
Services:
eu.xtreemos.system.communication.proxy.ServiceCallProxy,
eu.xtreemos.system.communication.redirector.ServiceCallRedirector,
eu.xtreemos.xosd.daemon.Daemon,
eu.xtreemos.xosd.security.rca.server.RCAServer,
eu.xtreemos.xosd.jobmng.JobMng,
eu.xtreemos.xosd.resourcemonitor.ResourceMonitor,
eu.xtreemos.xosd.resallocator.ResAllocator,
eu.xtreemos.xosd.security.vops.VOPS,
eu.xtreemos.xosd.resmng.ResMng,
eu.xtreemos.xosd.daemon.Daemon,
VO:
2c0e8cb2-4453-46fe-85b7-74874e76e7c2
Figure 11: Machine VO Attribute Certificate
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4 Isolation
The XtreemOS isolation mechanism allows fine-grained control of user applica-
tions on resource nodes as well as the enforcement of resource quotas (memory,
disk, cpu, network, etc.). Having such mechanism in place will increase the trust
on a XtreemOS system. On one side, resource providers are ensured that users’
application will be restricted to policies defined at the resource side. On the other
side, VO users are ensured that jobs running on containers at the resource side are
isolated from other users.
As presented in [2], isolation is usually defined along three axes: security
isolation, resource isolation, and fault isolation.
• Security isolation. Containers or sandboxes enable isolated execution envi-
ronments for VO users. Running a VO user’s job in a container assures that
no other users on the same node can see what they are doing, or compromise
information.
• Resource isolation. Each container is assigned a specified allocation of
CPU, memory, and disk, according to VO policies set on a VO user.
• Fault isolation. A fault or a process in one container does not adversely
affect processes running in other containers. The container is also indepen-
dent from the physical hardware, making it possible to move (i.e. check-
point/restart) a container from one physical node to another with no down-
time.
Design and implementation of XtreemOS isolation is based on virtualisation
technology by exploiting OS level resource containers to create isolated execu-
tion environments for VO users. High-level design of isolation in XtreemOS was
presented in deliverable D2.1.5 [2]. We introduce here main isolation capabilities
and describe the application programme interface.
XtreemOS provides support for resource isolation based on Linux Control
Group (cgroup) framework. As mentioned in Linux kernel document, to track-
ing resource usage of the system, one must require the basic notion of a group-
ing/partitioning of processes, with newly forked processes ending in the same
group (cgroup) as their parent process. Within a cgroup, one can provide re-
source limit to that group. The total resource usage of all processes contained in
the group. Fig.12 shows the high view on resource isolation in XtreemOS.
35
Figure 12: Resource Isolation: High View
4.1 Isolation Capabilities
OS level quotation set up
Goal
Linux kernel’s cgroup framework provides fundamental resource isolation sup-
port. The types of resource are: disk, memory , CPU sets and network bandwidth.
AMS sub system directly operate on OS’s cgroup filesystem to setup the quotation
for processes.
Actors
AMS sub-system.
Interface Used
Standard system interface to mount a cgroup system, write to a file in cgroup
filesystem.
Success Scenario
The resource quotation is set for the process executing a job.
Pre-conditions
36
The quotation is not set for target process.
Post-conditions
The quotation is set for target process, and corresponding cgroup directory is
established
OS level quotation remove
Goal
AMS sub system directly operate on OS’s cgroup filesystem to remove the
quotation settings for a process.
Actors
AMS sub-system.
Interface Used
Standard system interface to write a file in cgroup filesystem.
Success Scenario
The resource quotation is removed for the process executing a job.
Pre-conditions
The quotation is set for target process.
Post-conditions
The quotation is not set for target process, and corresponding cgroup directory
is removed.
OS level quotation adjustment
Goal
AMS sub system directly operate on OS’s cgroup filesystem to adjust the quo-
tation settings for a process.
Actors
AMS sub-system.
Interface Used
Standard system interface to write a file in cgroup filesystem.
Success Scenario
The resource quotation is adjusted for the process executing a job.
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Pre-conditions
The quotation is set for target process, and the corresponding cgroup directory
is established.
Post-conditions
The quotation is set for target process, and the corresponding cgroup directory
is established.
Job’s quota set by ExecMng
Goal
JobMng (or a service on behalf of JobMng) extracts the quota-related informa-
tion from the JSDL and XACML (policy from VOPS) and provides it to ExecMng,
so that it can establish the isolated session with proper parameters. ExecMng es-
tablish (through AMS) the isolated session with corresponding quota set.
Actors
ExecMng
Interface Used
ExecMng establish the isolated session by calling AMS’s interface function
xpamexecvp in function executeJob. The parameter for xpamexecvp has data type
"struct jobInfo". Quota information will be contained in this parameter.
Success Scenario
The resource quotation is set for the process executing a job.
Pre-conditions
Post-conditions
The quotation is set for target process, and the corresponding cgroup directory
is established.
Job’s quota remove by ExecMng
Goal
When the job has quit, job’s quota settings is removed.
Actors
ExecMng
Interface Used
ExecMng call pam_close_session in function xpamexecvp when job exits.
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Success Scenario
The resource quotation is removed for the process executing a job.
Pre-conditions
The quotation is set for target process, and the corresponding cgroup directory
is established.
Post-conditions
The quotation is not set for target process, and corresponding cgroup directory
is removed.
Job’s quota adjustment by ExecMng
Goal
Dynamically adjust job’s quota settings.
Actors
ExecMng
Interface Used
ExecMng call function setJobQuota with proper parameters.
Success Scenario
The resource quotation is adjusted for the process.
Pre-conditions
The quotation is set for target process, and the corresponding cgroup directory
is established.
Post-conditions The quotation is set for target process, and the corresponding
cgroup directory is established.
4.2 Design of Isolation Components in XtreemOS
Isolation in OS level is implemented by means of Linux cgroup framework.
To interact with cgroup framework, one must mount a file system of type
“cgroup". When mounting such file system, users may specify a comma-separated
list of subsystems to mount as the filesystem mount options.
For example, the following commands mount a cgroup hierarchy with re-
source type cpuset and memory in directory /cgroups/job1:
#mkdir -p /cgroups
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#mount -t cgroup job1 /cgroups -o memory,cpuset
The user may add a process to the above cgroup hierachy by appending thus
process’s pid to job1’s tasks file:
#echo $pid > /cgroups/job1/tasks
Then the user can can alter the memory limit of above cgroup hierachy by:
# echo 4M > /cgroups/job1/memory.limit_in_bytes
As mentioned in previous section, AMS subsystem directly interact with OS
for upper layers of XtreemOS. ExecMng directly interact with AMS subsystem on
behave of AEM. In current development cycle, the JobMng (or a service on behalf
of JobMng) extracts the quota-related information from the JSDL and XACML
(policy from VOPS) and provides it to ExecMng, ExecMng invoke AMS sub-
system with job parameter which include quotation information, AMS set the
quotation for the process that run the job.
4.3 Application Programming Interface for Isolation
From the ExecMng point of view, all the other existing interfaces needn’t be
changed except that in order to set isolation information, except following pro-
gram interface should be called when isolation setting for a VO changed.
Function name setJobQuota(unsigned char *jobcert, struct jobQuota *jobquo)
Parameters
• jobcert: pointer to a buffer contains a job’s x509 certificate.
• jobquo: jobquo has following structure (defined in "XPamAPIs.h"),
/** type of quota */
enum XPLY_QT {
XPLY_QT_ABS, /**< ABS - absolute value */
XPLY_QT_REL /**< REL - relative value */
};
/** type of resource for enforcement */
enum XPLY_REST {
XPLY_REST_CPU, /**< CPU - CPU resource */
XPLY_REST_MEM, /**< MEM - Memory resource */
XPLY_REST_DISK, /**< DISK - Disk resource */
XPLY_REST_NETWORK, /**< NETWORK - network bandwidth */
XPLY_REST_NPROC, /**< NPROC - maximun number of open process */
XPLY_REST_NOFILE /**< NOFILE - maximum number of open files */
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Figure 13: Isolation Components
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};
struct jobQuota {
enum XPLY_REST restype;
enum XPLY_QT quo_type;
int quo_val;
};
use case
Limit the VO’s disk usage to 10M:
struct jobQuota jobquota2 = {
XPLY_REST_DISK,
XPLY_QT_ABS,
101
};
if(setJobQuota(cert_buffer, &jobquota)) {
fprintf (stderr,"Can not set job quota");
return (void*)-1;
}
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5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this deliverable, we provided an overview of the XtreemOS trust model and
the different alternative settings of this model, their pros and cons. We also dis-
cussed the formats of digital certificates used to exchange entity attributes, such
as identities and features, among the users, resources and services in XtreemOS,
and gave examples of such certificates. Finally, we defined the capabilities, design
and application programming interface of the XtreemOS isolation service, which
is an example of a trust service that enforces non-interference among user jobs to
varying degrees.
One of the future uses of the XtreemOS operating system that is envisaged is
in the area of Cloud computing [16]. This new playground for XtreemOS will
pose new challenges to the trust model, mechanisms and services, which will pro-
vide directions for future work. Among these will be the challenge of managing
credential in federated Clouds and ensuring clean isolation among users and re-
sources belonging to different Clouds.
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